The Very Long Range Mission
In the fall of 1944, 7th Fighter Command received the first instructions for possible overseas deployment. Vague in details, it was laid out that the purpose for the 7th was to provide fighter escort for the VLR operations, to destroy Japanese naval and air forces in the Bonin Islands, and to defend Iwo Jima and develop air bases on the island after its capture and occupation.
Preparations were made and in late November, 1944, standard operating procedures for the VLR mission began to be created, through much research, intelligence, and trial and error in testing. Up to that point, no mission profile like this had ever existed. Everything from aircraft capabilities, communication, air sea rescue, logistics, and more had to be determined. In January, 1945, the SOP draft was finalized.
Included in this document and policy were details on: armament and bombing, gun sight usage, rockets, signal equipment including the AN/ARA-8 and navigational aids, maintenance problems, combat radius, power settings, pilot fatigue, fuel tanks, tactics, and training.
Below is the mission plan for the 15th and 21st Fighter Groups on their first ever VLR mission to Japan. The mission occurred on April 7, 1945 and was to be a fighter escort of B-29’s over Tokyo. The navigation, communication, and air sea rescue plans are presented, as well as some ‘last minute’ amendments. To the right is a hand drawn map of this mission from the 78th Fighter Squadron, 15th Fighter Group.
Difficulties Encountered
Weather
In actual missions, weather was the most important single obstacle encountered by 7th Fighter Command. Lack of reasonably accurate and timely forecasts made operations extremally difficult since formations could not fly through or above the extremely turbulent frontal weather they might encounter on the way to their target.
Photograph Coverage & Intelligence
The greatest need of 7th Fighter Command during their VLR operations was that of photographic coverage and maps of target areas. The intelligence section of command was repeatedly requested by all operating personnel for mission planning, so much so that the 7th Fighter Command requested a photo reconnaissance unit (which none was available until near the end of the war). The photographic labs on Iwo were also understaffed and overtaxed when the occasional single print might become available, they were already several weeks to months old. Relying on the US Navy, and the 20th Air Force, a lack of communication between them and the 7th made securing the necessary photos very difficult.
Other Responsibilities
Although 7th Fighter Command’s primary mission was to provide maximum support for B-29 operations, they were also expected to perform many other duties. These included CAP (Combat Air Patrol) for Iwo Jima, assist with ASR (Air Search Rescue), neutralization of the nearby islands (which included attacks on Haha and Chichi Jima), as well as anti-submarine/shipping nearby, these additional functions constituted a problem in terms of attaining maximum efficiency in VLR operations.
Replacements & Morale
The balance between establishing a replacement-loss level was an issue as the war progressed for the 7th Fighter Command. The tour of duty for pilots was set at 14 effective VLR missions, 150 VLR combat hours, or six months time in the forward area. But this only made a pilot eligible for rotation, and actual release was contingent on replacement pilots, which were not readily available. That and unfavorable living conditions on Iwo, extremely long flights over water, and adverse ditching characteristics all contributed to low morale. For the groundcrew, most of them had been already overseas for 30 months, some as long as 48.
Liaison & Coordination
As mentioned in photographic coverage, a lack of intelligence as well as sometimes supplies even hampered 7th Fighter Command operations. There was also a feeling of ‘where do we belong’ with the 7th Fighter Command. Assigned to XXI Bomber Command, who were located about 700 miles away, and also working with USN Task Force 93, there was much delay and misunderstanding that occured, leading to issues with mission efficiency. This also included change of targets which would sometimes give the intelligence section about twelve hours to prepare pilots for their missions even though it was told from the higher ups they would at least 36 hours notice.
Aircraft Issues
As each of the three main fighter groups used P-51 Mustangs, there were several modifications and subsequent issues that needed to be corrected for the VLR flights. Completed mainly on Saipan and then Iwo Jima, the AN/ARA-8 Homing adapter was installed on all the Mustangs, which was imperative for the long range flights mainly over water. However, the kits to do this were in short supply and some aircraft did not get this installed until mid June 1945. Due to the larger 110 and 165 drop tanks used, sway braces had to be constructed on site by ground crew at first until a full design and production was available. This also included work on the zero length rail rocket launchers and new K-14 computing gunsights, which were in short supply and ground crew had no training in both of these installations.